Daniel P. Lopresti
“Quantifying Information Leakage in Document
Redaction” (with A. L.
Spitz), Proceedings of the First ACM
Workshop
on Hardcopy Document Processing (in association with Thirteenth
Conference on Information and Knowledge Management), November
2004, Washington, DC, pp. 63-69.
Abstract
In this paper, we examine ways in which sensitive information might
leak through the process of redaction. Such attacks apply known methods
from document image analysis and natural language processing to recover
text thought to have been obliterated for the purposes of public
release. Systematically identifying and testing these weaknesses is a
first step towards designing effective countermeasures. We describe our
development of a prototype semi-automated system intended to accept as
input a redacted document and provide feedback to the user as to
whether the document might suffer from such leaks.
Paper ( PDF 525 kbytes)
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